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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals con-
sidered cases involving a wide variety of criminal procedure issues.
There were, however, no extraordinary or breakthrough decisions.
Overall, the Tenth Circuit opinions displayed a well-balanced approach
to upholding the constitutional rights of the defendant, while meeting
the legitimate concerns of the government and the public. The Tenth
Circuit was more protective of fourth amendment rights than was the
United States Supreme Court in its decision regarding the government's
use of electronic tracking devices. In its decisions in other areas, in par-
ticular involving the fifth and sixth amendments, the court effectively
used precedent to further develop the law. This article will discuss some
of the more important and timely decisions of the Tenth Circuit during
the survey period, with special emphasis on the court's decisions involv-
ing the right to counsel, security sweep searches, consensual police




In United States v. Karo,i the Supreme Court reversed a Tenth Cir-
cuit decision 2 suppressing evidence obtained with an electronic tracking
beacon (beeper).
3
In September 1980, the government obtained an order authorizing
a beeper to be placed in a can of ether defendants Karo, Horton, and
Harley had ordered through a government informant. The government
used the beeper and other types of surveillance to follow the ether can's
travels for five months. 4 Agents used both visual and beeper surveil-
lance to trace the ether to Karo's home in Albuquerque, New Mexico
and then used the beeper to verify that the ether remained in Karo's
home.5 Later that day, the beeper alone was used to locate the ether in
defendant Horton's home. Two days later, the beeper alone was again
used to locate the ether can in Horton's father's home. The next day.
agents used the beeper to locate the ether in a commercial self-storage
facility where it stayed for approximately three weeks. After the man-
ager of the storage facility informed the agents the ether can had been
I. 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984).
2. United States v. Karo, 710 F.2d 1433 (10th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 3296
(1984).
3. Id. at 1440.
4. Id. at 1435.
5. Id. at 1437.
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removed, the beeper located the ether can at another self-storage
facility.
6
Over three months later, using a closed circuit video camera, the
agents watched defendant Rhodes take the ether from the locker and
then used visual and beeper surveillance to follow the ether to Rhodes'
home where it remained in a truck parked in the driveway. Later that
day, agents followed the truck to a residence in Taos, New Mexico. The
beeper was used to monitor the ether while it was in the Taos residence.
The agents obtained a search warrant for the residence and then seized
cocaine and laboratory equipment.7 Because the order authorizing the
beeper had been obtained with affidavits containing deliberate misrepre-
sentations, the district court declared the order invalid and granted the
defendants' motion to suppress the evidence.8
2. The Tenth Circuit Decision
On appeal, the government did not challenge the district court's
finding that the order authorizing the beeper was invalid. Instead, it
argued the order was unnecessary because the beeper constituted a min-
imal intrusion and because the government informant had given permis-
sion to have the beeper installed in the can. 9
The Tenth Circuit struck down each of the government's argu-
ments. First, the court found the government informant's permission to
place the beeper in the can was irrelevant because all individuals have a
legitimate expectation that objects coming into their rightful possession
do not have electronic devices attached to them. 10 The court found
electronic devices to be particularly intrusive because they give law en-
forcement officials the opportunity to monitor the location of the objects
at all times and in all places, including private residences and other areas
where a person has an unquestioned right to be free of governmental
intrusions.'" Based on this reasoning, the court found that the fourth
amendment violation occurred when the ether can with an attached
beeper came into the defendants' possession without a valid warrant.
12
The Tenth Circuit also determined that legitimate expectations of
privacy are violated when a beeper is used to trace the movement of an
object while in private residences or similarly protected places without
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1435.
9. Id. at 1436, 1438. The government also argued the order was unnecessary be-
cause the defendants had no expectation of privacy in the can because ether is contraband.
The Tenth Circuit found, though, that the defendants had a legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy in the can of ether because ether is not contraband; at most, it is a substance rightfully
possessed but suspected of use in criminal activity. Id. at 1436. Accord, United States v.
Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 944 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 111 (1st
Cir. 1977).
10. Karo, 710 F.2d at 1438.
1i. Id. The court also noted that, because items of personal property rarely travel on
their own, a beeper, out of necessity, traces the movements of a person who possesses an
object with a beeper. Id.
12. Id. at 1439.
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first obtaining a warrant. 13 Because the beeper in Karo had been in-
stalled with an invalid court order' 4 and had been used to monitor a can
of ether while in private residences and storage lockers, areas in which a
person holds legitimate expectations of privacy,15 the Tenth Circuit up-
held the district court's suppression order.' 6
3. The Supreme Court's Decision
The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's suppression of ev-
idence in Karo. 17 Although the majority, per Justice White, found that
the government is not free to monitor a beeper in private residences
without a warrant,' 8 the Court determined that there were sufficient as-
sertions in the search warrant affidavit that would have allowed the
agents to secure the warrant without relying on information unlawfully
obtained with the beeper.1 9 The Court determined that the evidence
seized in the Taos residence was not tainted by any unconstitutional sur-
veillance by breaking the five-month surveillance into separate parts.
The Court first impliedly determined that any evidence obtained
through use of the beeper prior to the ether can's arrival in the second
storage facility was unnecessary to establish probable cause for the issu-
ance of the search warrant. The Court then determined that, because
the beeper alone was used to trace the ether to the second storage facil-
ity, the discovery was untainted by any possible prior illegal monitoring
of the beeper. Next, the Court found that locating the ether at the sec-
ond storage facility was not an illegal search because the beeper did not
identify the specific locker in which the ether was located and did not
reveal anything about the contents of the locker which defendants Hor-
ton and Harley had rented. The Court then found that the surveillance
of the ether after it was removed from the second storage facility was
constitutional under United States v. Knotts20 because the ether was fol-
13. Id. The court distinguished Karo from United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276
(1983), in which the Supreme Court held that the monitoring of a beeper did not violate
the defendants' expectations of privacy because the chloroform container, to which the
beeper was attached, was followed only on public roads. Once the chloroform reached a
private residence, the beeper was not used. Id. at 284-85. The Tenth Circuit found other
differences between Karo and Knolts which dictated a different outcome. These differences
include the following:
The Knotts case involved surveillance over only a few days; monitoring in the in-
stant case took place over five months. . . . In Knotts the officers lost track of the
automobile carrying the drum once on the public highway; here the officers lost
track of the ether can for significant periods of time, after the ether had come to
rest in residences and a rented locker. In the instant case, most of the tracing to
new locations was possible only by use of the direction finder to locate the
beeper.
Karo, 710 F.2d at 1439.
14. Karo, 710 F.2d at 1435.
15. Id. at 1439.
16. Id. at 1440.
17. 104 S. Ct. at 3307.
18. Id. at 3304.
19. Id. at 3306.
20. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
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lowed while it travelled on public highways. 2 '
The Supreme Court also rejected the Tenth Circuit's determination
that the transfer by the government of an object containing a beeper
infringes on the transferee's privacy interests. 22 The Court stated that
the transfer of the can with an "unmonitored beeper" created only a
potential for an invasion of privacy. As a result, the Court held that any
invasion of privacy occurred only through the monitoring of the
beeper.23
The Supreme Court's decision in Karo substantially expands the
government's authority to use beepers without a warrant. In effect, the
government is free, based on any circumstances, to install a beeper in an
object it knows will be transferred to a third party and to monitor that
beeper everywhere it goes as long as it is not monitored while actually
inside one's own private residence or similarly protected area. The
Supreme Court's holding that only the monitoring of an unwarranted
beeper while inside one's own private residence is a fourth amendment
violation 24 does not adequately protect against this invasive form of
governmental conduct. 2 5 As one Sixth Circuit judge observed, "ordina-
rily we can protect our privacy by insuring that we are not being fol-
lowed, and that others do not know where we are going. The beeper
21. 104 S. Ct. at 3306.
22. Id. at 3302.
23. Id. Justice O'Connor, withJustice Rehnquist, concurred in part and concurred in
the judgment. Justice O'Connor felt that the privacy interests involved in the use of a
beeper to track the movements of a container are "unusually narrow." Id. at 3307
(O'Connor, J., concurring). O'Connor then concluded that a person's right not to have a
container tracked by a beeper exists only when the beeper is monitored when visual track-
ing of the container is not possible and the person has an interest in the container sufficient
to empower him or her to give effective consent to a search of the container. Id. at 3310.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurred in part and dis-
sented in part. Stevens agreed with the majority's conclusion that beeper surveillance of
property concealed from public view is a search, id. at 3310 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part), but would have gone one step further than the majority. Stevens
would have found that the attachment of the beeper to the container of ether constituted a
seizure, id. at 3310-11, because a private citizen has the right to assume his or her posses-
sions "are not infected with concealed electronic devices." Id. at 3314.
24. Prior to Karo, at least two other circuits had held that beeper surveillance of per-
sonal property in private areas constituted a search and seizure within the fourth amend-
ment. United States v. Cassity, 720 F.2d 451, 455-56 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 944 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 113-14
(1st Cir. 1977). The Ninth Circuit and, surprisingly, the Tenth Circuit had held that
beeper surveillance constituted only a slight intrusion into legitimate expectations of pri-
vacy. United States v. Brock, 667 F.2d 1311, 1321 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Clayborne, Jr., 584 F.2d 346, 351 (10th Cir. 1978).
25. Prior to Karo, at least one other circuit recognized that the transfer of an object
containing a beeper violated the fourth amendment. In United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d
938 (6th Cir. 1980), the court held that governmental consent to a warrantless beeper
installation lasts only as long as the government has possession of the object containing
the beeper. At the point of transfer, any governmental consent would become ineffectual.
Id. at 944.
At least two circuits, though, stated that no fourth amendment violation occurred if
the beeper was installed while the object was in the government's possession. United
States v. Brock, 667 F.2d 1311, 1319 n.4 (9th Cir. 1982) (dicta); United States v. Knotts,
662 F.2d 515, 517 n.2 (8th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
[Vol. 62:1
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destroys our ability to protect the privacy of our movement." '2 6 The
Karo decision condones the erosion of what was once a legitimate pri-
vacy expectation. If indeed one accepts the proposition that an elec-
tronic beeper attached to one's personal property constitutes a
substantial invasion of privacy, then the Karo decision fails to uphold the
fourth amendment purpose of requiring a warrant to issue upon prob-
able cause prior to such an invasion.
B. Security Sweep Searches
Both United States v. Riccio2 7 and United States v. Tabor 28 involved the
"protective search, emergency situation" exception to the fourth
amendment's warrant requirement. In both cases, the Tenth Circuit
found that emergency situations existed and, therefore, warrants were
unnecessary.
29
1. United States v. Riccio
OnJune 11, 1982 the Durango Police received notice that the Burns
National Bank had been robbed by a lone gunman wearing a ski mask.
After collecting the money in a brown bag, the robber forced a passing
motorist to take him to the outskirts of town where he disappeared into
the hills on foot.3 0 Later, the teller told police she thought she recog-
nized the robber's voice as belonging to "Steve," a man who worked for
the Federal Lumber Company.
3 '
When the police contacted Federal Lumber, an employee told them
Steve Riccio had recently been fired. The employee then gave the police
Riccio's address and a physical description. The police went to Riccio's
trailer house, but Riccio was not there. The police showed a bank sur-
veillance photo to one of Riccio's roommates who stated that the man in
the picture looked like Riccio. The roommates left after agreeing not to
return without permission, and the trailer was placed under
surveillance.
32
About 10:30 p.m. that evening, Riccio entered the trailer. Over a
loudspeaker, the police told Riccio the trailer was surrounded and or-
dered him to surrender. Riccio responded with gunfire. Eventually,
Riccio tried to escape from the trailer but was shot in the attempt.
33
After Riccio was shot, some officers administered first aid while
others conducted a sweep or security search. An officer saw a large
amount of money on a bed, part of which was wrapped in Burns Na-
tional Bank bands, but did not seize it at that time. A search warrant was
26. United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 949 (6th Cir. 1980) (Keith, J., concurring).
27. 726 F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1984).
28. 722 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1983).
29. Id. at 598; Riccio, 726 F.2d at 642.
30. Riccio, 726 F.2d at 639.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 639-40.
33. Id. at 640.
1984]
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later obtained, and the money was then seized, along with other items. 34
On appeal from his conviction for armed robbery, Riccio claimed
the affidavit used to obtain the search warrant invalidated the search
warrant because it contained knowingly-made false statements. 3 5 One
of the statements under attack in the affidavit 36 claimed the security
search was made to locate anyone else who may have been in the trailer.
Riccio challenged this statement, arguing that the officers knew no one
else was in the trailer because it had been under surveillance.3 7 The
court found that because the surveillance covered only the front of the
trailer, it would have been possible for someone to enter the trailer
through the rear windows without being seen. Additionally, because the
officers were shot at from the trailer at different times and from different
areas, the officers had not been unreasonable in suspecting that some-
one else was in the trailer.38 The court held that sufficient exigent cir-
cumstances existed to support a "security search" of the trailer.
39
2. United States v. Tabor
In United States v. Tabor,40 the Tenth Circuit also upheld a "security
search." Tabor was suspected of running an illegal book-making opera-
tion, and a search warrant was obtained covering Tabor's home and list-
ing certain gambling "necessities. ' 4 1 Federal agents executed the
search warrant and patted down Tabor, who told the agents he had no
weapons other than the pocketknife found on him and that no one else
was in the house. But upon searching Tabor's home the agents discov-
ered four guns. 4 2 The agents then began a security search of the area
and buildings surrounding the house, during the course of which they
heard a noise coming from the barn. One of the agents checked the loft
of the barn, claimed to see a cat, and subsequently discovered 150
pounds of marijuana, which was seized at that time.4 3 Tabor was later
convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to
34. Id.
35. Id. at 640-41.
36. Riccio also argued that a statement in the affidavit, indicating that both Riccio's
roommates thought the picture taken by the bank camera could be of Riccio, was false and,
thus, tainted the affidavit. The court determined that although the statement was inaccu-
rate, in that one of the roommates had said he could not identify the picture as being one
of Riccio, it did not invalidate the warrant. According to the Tenth Circuit, there were
enough accurate statements in the affidavit to support the warrant. Id. at 64 1.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 642. The court focused on United States v. Astorga-Torres, 682 F.2d 1331
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982), because of its similarity to this case. InAstorga-
Torres, the Ninth Circuit stated that "[wlhile the presence of anyone else in the cabin was
most unlikely (citation omitted), officers who have been subjected to pistol fire from the
front door and bathroom window can hardly be said to be acting unreasonably when they
take steps to make sure of their safety." Id. at 1334-35.
39. Riccio, 726 F.2d at 642.
40. 722 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1983).
41. Id. at 597.
42. Id.
43. Id. Meanwhile, the search pursuant to the warrant was taking place at the house.






On appeal, Tabor objected to the exploratory nature of the search
beyond the described residence and the continuation of the search after
the designated items had been found. 4 5 The court agreed with the dis-
trict court's findings that Tabor's barn, which was not included in the
search warrant, was sufficiently close to the house to come within the
curtilage and receive fourth amendment protection. However, the court
stated that a security search may be justified by fear that an officer's life
or the lives of those around him might be in danger.46 Adding that a
suspicion of danger must be clear and reasonable in light of all the sur-
rounding circumstances, 4 7 the court found that the exigent circum-
stances present in this case justified a cursory search of Tabor's
property. 4 8 A broader search was then justified by the noise the agents
heard in the barn and their suspicion that another, possibly armed, per-
son might be on the premises. Once the agent was legally inside the
barn, the plain view doctrine legitimated the seizure of the marijuana.
4 9
C. Terry Stop vs. Arrest
United States v. Cooper5 0 involved the Tenth Circuit's application of
Terry v. Ohio.5 1 In Cooper, the court was forced to determine whether the
stopping of defendants' car and subsequent events constituted an inves-
tigatory stop or an arrest.
5 2
The dispute in Cooper revolved around pinpointing the exact time
the defendants Cooper and Threat were arrested. On October 14,
1982, Cooper bought some children's clothing with a $100 bill at aJ.C.
Penney's in Kansas City, Kansas. When Cooper came out of the store,
Threat met her. They then got into a pink and white Cadillac which
secret service agents had under surveillance because it had been con-
nected with prior incidents of passing counterfeit money. The agents
followed the Cadillac through the parking lot, but when the car acceler-
ated to an excessive speed, the agents used the flashing red lights and
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. (citing United States v. Gardner, 627 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1980)).
47. Tabor, 722 F.2d at 598. The court stressed this point by stating: "Officers of the
law are not given free reign to conduct sweep searches on the pretense that a dangerous
situation might be imminent." Id.
48. id. These circumstances included:
(1) The confidential informant had allegedly provided information which led the
agents to believe appellant was frequently in possession of a .357 Magnum re-
volver. A box of .357 Magnum ammunition was found on the premises lending
support to this allegation, but no weapon of that type was found; (2) vehicles were
present in the area which were not identified as belonging to appellant; (3) appel-
lant's dog was behaving in an agitated manner; and (4) appellant had lied about
the existence of other weapons on the premises and had at the same time told the
agents that no other persons were on the premises.
Id.
49. Id.
50. 733 F.2d 1360 (10th Cir. 1984).
51. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
52. Cooper, 733 F.2d at 1363.
1984]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
sirens on their car to stop the Cadillac. At this time, the agents did not
have probable cause to stop the defendants.
53
Cooper and Threat claimed they were told they were under arrest
when the agents reached their car. 54 The government maintained that
Cooper voluntarily got out of the Cadillac and accompanied the agents
to J.C. Penney's, where a counterfeit bill was located and Cooper was
identified by the clerk as the one who had passed it.5 5 The government
contended both defendants were arrested at this time. While Cooper
went back to the store with the agents, Threat stayed in the Cadillac.
Once again the government maintained this was voluntary, while Threat
claimed he remained because he was under arrest. The trial court found
the stop was a justified investigatory stop and that the defendants volun-
tarily cooperated with the agents.
56
The Tenth Circuit recognized that it is difficult to determine the
difference between a Terry stop and an arrest. 5 7 In making its determi-
nation, the court distinguished a case relied on by the defendants, United
States v. Hill.58 In Hill the Fifth Circuit determined that although the
defendant, Hill, was not formally arrested, he had in fact been arrested.
When stopped by a federal agent at an airport, Hill had agreed to speak
with the agent but refused to be searched without a warrant. The agent
then asked Hill to accompany him to an office a short distance away.
Hill -silently began walking toward the office but then began running
down the hall. The Fifth Circuit determined that the agent's request
that Hill accompany him to the office constituted an arrest. Because the
arrest was not supported by probable cause and because Hill had not
consented to go to the office, the arrest violated the fourth amend-
ment.5 9 Because the district court had specifically found that there was
a legitimate Terry stop after which Cooper and Threat consented to co-
operate with the officers, 60 the Tenth Circuit found Hill to be
unpersuasive.
6 '
53. Id. Although not expressly stated in the facts, it was implied that, at the time
Cooper and Threat were stopped, the agents did not know the defendants had used a
counterfeit bill to acquire clothing at the store. The court, however, did find that the fact
that the Cadillac had been connected with other transactions involving counterfeit money
and Threat was enough to create at least a high degree of suspicion. Id. at 1365.
54. Id. Cooper and Threat also claimed that the manner of the stop and the subse-
quent show of authority amounted to an arrest. Id.
55. Id. at 1363.
56. Id.
57. Id. The court first discussed the three types of police/citizen encounters: volun-
tary encounters; Terry stops, which must be based on reasonable suspicion; and arrests.
58. 626 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1980).
59. Id. at 431-37.
60. Cooper, 733 F.2d at 1364.
61. Judge McKay wrote a concurring opinion in which he agreed with the majority's
finding that the stop in Cooper was a reasonable Terry stop. He found there was an abun-
dance of evidence to support an articulable suspicion even though a substantial show of




In United States v. Johnson,62 the Tenth Circuit confirmed the propri-
ety of an inventory search of an automobile pursuant to an arrest.
At 2:30 a.m. the Tulsa Police Department received a call reporting
that a man with a gun was sitting in a yellow Cadillac in Brandy's Club
Lounge parking lot. When the police arrived, they found Johnson,
highly intoxicated in his Cadillac with a .357 caliber Magnum revolver
on the passenger seat. 63 Johnson was arrested, handcuffed, searched,
and placed on the ground where he later passed out. The police then
conducted an inventory search of the Cadillac and had the car towed.
During the course of their search, the police found 26.63 grams of co-
caine, a box of .45 caliber ammunition, and various drug parapherna-
lia. 6 4 Johnson was later found guilty in federal court of possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute.
6 5
On appealJohnson claimed, among other things, that the inventory
search of his car was unconstitutional. The Tenth Circuit found that it
was a search pursuant to arrest and, therefore, the search of the passen-
ger compartment of the Cadillac was constitutional6 6 under New York v.
Belton6 7 and United States v. Martin.
68
Martin, which had facts similar toJohnson, upheld the constitutional-
ity of an inventory search of an automobile. As in Johnson, the police had
the car towed because the owner was noticeably drunk and unable to
drive. Prior to towing the car, the police conducted an inventory
search. 6 9 The Martin court found that the inventory search was a rou-
tine procedure for securing an automobile's contents 70 and that the
search and towing were proper under South Dakota v. Opperman.
7 1
The Tenth Circuit foundJohnson to be indistinguishable from Mar-
tin. The court went so far as to state that the police had a responsibility
to tow and search Johnson's car as part of their "community caretaking
functions." 72 In fact, the court found further justification for the search
in Johnson because a revolver was found on the front seat of the Cadillac.
The court felt the presence of the revolver and the unmatching bullets
62. 734 F.2d 503 (10th Cir. 1984).
63. Id. at 504.
64. The cocaine was found in Johnson's pocket. The .45 caliber ammunition was
found in the passenger compartment of the Cadillac and the drug paraphernalia, including
scales, a sifter, a cocaine analysis kit, and a plastic bag of white powder, was found in two
brown cases in the trunk. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). In Belton, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
a search of the passenger compartment of an automobile pursuant to the arrest of the
automobile's passengers as part of the "within the arrestees' control" exception to the
warrant requirement, even though the arrestees were not in the car, were handcuffed and
were placed on opposite sides of the highway.
68. 566 F.2d 1143 (10th Cir. 1977).
69. Id. at 1144.
70. Id. at 1145.
71. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
72. 734 F.2d at 505 (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368-69 (1976)).
1984]
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in the passenger compartment justified the suspicion that another
weapon or matching bullets would be found elsewhere in the car.
7 3
II. FiFrH AMENDMENT
A. Right Against Self-Incrimination in a Multiple-Defendant Trial
United States v. McClure7 4 involved two important issues for the
Tenth Circuit. The first issue involved the determination of the right to
separate trials when co-defendants have antagonistic defenses. The sec-
ond issue involved the question of whether defense counsel has a duty
to comment on a co-defendant's failure to testify, which would in turn
require separate trials based on the co-defendant's fifth amendment
rights.
McClure and Tafoya were charged with drug trafficking. 75 At trial,
McClure elected to testify, while Tafoya asserted his fifth amendment
right not to testify. 7 6 In closing arguments, McClure's attorney stated
that McClure's willingness to testify showed he had nothing to hide.
Tafoya's counsel objected, claiming the remarks indirectly implicated
Tafoya for his failure to testify. 7 7 Both defendants were convicted of
distribution of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute.
78
On appeal, the defendants argued that the district court should
have used its discretionary power under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure to order separate trials, based on the actual and in-
herent prejudice which would result from a joint trial. 79 First, the de-
fendants argued that their defenses were directly antagonistic and
mutually exclusive. 80 Second, they argued that the joint trial resulted in
a confrontation between Tafoya's fifth amendment right to remain silent
and McClure's sixth amendment right to confront witnesses.
8 1
The Tenth Circuit stated that in order to establish that a trial court
abused its discretion in denying a defendant's request for severance, the
defendant must prove his or her joint trial resulted in actual prejudice.
82
Additionally, in order to receive a new trial based on antagonistic de-
fenses, the court determined that the co-defendants must have irrecon-
cilable defenses. The existence of mere conflicting defenses is not
sufficient to show prejudice. 83 From United States v. Crawford84 and
United States v. Johnson,8 5 the Tenth Circuit implicitly adopted the stan-
73. 734 F.2d at 505 (citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 443 (1973)).
74. 734 F.2d 484 (10th Cir. 1984).
75. Id. at 486-87.
76. Id. at 489.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 486.
79. Id. at 487.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 489.
82. Id. at 487 (citing United Stiucs v. Long, 705 F.2d 1259, 1263 (10th Cir. 1983)).
83. McClure, 734 F.2d at 488.
84. 581 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1978).
85. 478 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1973).
[Vol. 62:1
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dard that irreconcilable defenses can be established if each co-defendant
was "the government's best witness against the other.''86 The court
then found that little actual prejudice resulted from the trial, implying
that there was no generalized antagonism between the defendants and
that neither defendant was the government's best witness against the
other.
87
The defendants based their second argument on dictum from De
Luna v. United States 88 which stated that a defendant's right to confront
witnesses allows and sometimes requires his or her attorney to draw all
rational inferences from a co-defendant's failure to testify.8 9 Under
these circumstances, separate trials would be required if one defendant
invoked his or her fifth amendment privilege while the other elected to
testify.
9 0
The court rejected the De Luna dictum, stating that under no cir-
cumstances is a defendant's attorney obligated to comment on a co-de-
fendant's failure to testify. 9 ' The court emphasized that the fifth
amendment is properly no part of the evidence submitted to the jury
and no inferences can be drawn from the invocation of the privilege be-
cause it is without probative value on the issue of a defendant's guilt or
innocence.9 2 The court also stated that its holding does not impair a
defendant's sixth amendment right to confront witnesses.9 3 If a defend-
ant wants to blame a non-testifying co-defendant, he or she can always
testify against the co-defendant.9 4 Thus, the defendants in McClure were
not entitled to separate trials based on conflicting fifth and sixth amend-
ment rights. The court also added that Tafoya's fifth amendment rights
were not violated during McClure's closing argument because Mc-
Clure's attorney made no direct reference to Tafoya.
95
The De Luna dictum has not been well received by other circuits. At
least one other circuit has rejected it 9 6 and numerous other circuits, in-
86. McClure, 734 F.2d at 488 (quoting Crawford, 581 F.2d at 492 and johnson, 478 F.2d
at 1133).
87. McClure, 734 F.2d at 492.
88. 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962).
89. Id. at 143.
90. McClure, 734 F.2d at 490.




95. Id. Accord United States v. Petullo, 709 F.2d 1178, 1182 (7th Cir. 1983) (statement
by counsel asking the jury only to draw favorable inferences from his client's willingness to
testify is not per se prejudicial to a co-defendant who does not testify).
96. United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1967). In dictum, the Sixth
Circuit rejected De Luna and stated that any comment by a defendant's attorney on a co-
defendant's failure to testify at trial would not be permissible. Id. at 265.
The De Luna dictum was also rejected in United States v. Marquez, 319 F. Supp. 1016,
1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 449 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1971). In Marquez, the district court
rejected a defendant's contention that his co-defendants' refusal to testify was evidence of
his innocence. The court also said any comment by the defendant on his co-defendants'
failure to testify would constitute a fifth amendment violation. Id. at 1018-19.
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and loumd it
unnecessary to decide the De Luna question because the defendant had failed to show
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cluding the Fifth Circuit, 97 have substantially restricted its scope. These
cases fall into two categories. The first states that a defendant is not
entitled to a severance based on a desire to comment on a co-defend-
ant's failure to testify unless the defendant shows real prejudice and sub-
stantial benefit to the defense.9 8 The second category of cases refuses
to grant a severance unless the defendant and co-defendant have mutu-
ally exclusive and irreconcilable defenses. 99
The Tenth Circuit's rejection of De Luna in McClure'0 0 is the only
logical approach to this situation if one accepts the basic premise that
the assertion of the fifth amendment privilege carries no implication of
guilt. 10 ' As McClure seems to indicate, it would be a paradox to accept
the premise that silence is not to be implied as guilt but nevertheless
hold that a defendant has the right to infer that it does. As the Tenth
Circuit pointed out in McClure, the fifth amendment privilege is without
probative value on the issue of a defendant's guilt or innocence.'
0 2
B. Spontaneous Questioning in a Prison Setting
United States v. Scalf 10 3 concerned the fifth amendment rights of a
federal inmate. The appellant, Scalf, was questioned in his cell within a
disciplinary segregation unit at the Federal Correctional Institution in El
Reno, Oklahoma. On the morning of August 28, 1982, Scalf attacked
another inmate, Spence, with two homemade knives. Scalf chased
Spence and stabbed him five or six times. After the inmates had been
returned to their cells, Officer Sanchez, a security officer, went to Scalf's
cell and asked him what was going on. Scalf replied that he did not want
any problems with the officer and that he did not like Spence. Scalf also
told Officer Sanchez he threw the knives out the window.' 0 4 Scalf was
later charged with and convicted of assault with a deadly weapon and
sufficient inconsistencies between his defense and those of his co-defendants to justify a
severance. Marquez, 449 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1971).
97. United States v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815, 831-32 (5th Cir. 1971); Burleski v. United
States, 405 F.2d 253, 265 (5th Cir. 1969). The Fifth Circuit has narrowed but still follows
De Luna. In United States v. Aguiar, 610 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1980), the court stated that
the defense attorney's "proper decision to draw the jury's attention to her co-defendants'
silence would penalize the fifth amendment privilege of her co-defendants and would cre-
ate the sort of incompatibility between their defenses that under De Luna requires a sever-
ance." Id. at 1301 (emphasis added).
98. United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289, 1319 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v.
De La Cruz Bellinger, 422 F.2d 723, 727 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Caci, 401 F.2d
664, 672 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Kahn, 381 F.2d 824, 840 (7th Cir. 1967).
99. United States v. Johnson, 713 F.2d 633, 652 (11 th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910, 930 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977); United
States v. White, 482 F.2d 485, 488 (4th Cir. 1973).
100. In an earlier case, Kolod v. United States, 371 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1967), the
Tenth Circuit questioned the validity of the De Luna dictum because of the procedural
problems it creates, such as the elimination ofjoint trials or vesting in the defendant the
right to a mistrial during final arguments. Id. at 991 (quoting United States v. De Luna,
308 F.2d 140, 156 (5th Cir. 1962) (Bell, J., concurring)).
101. See Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1943).
102. McClure, 734 F.2d at 491.
103. 725 F.2d 1272 (10th Cir. 1984).
104. Id. at 1273.
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conveying a weapon from place to place within a federal penitentiary.
0 5
On appeal, Scalf claimed his statements to Officer Sanchez should
not have been admitted into evidence because they were obtained in
violation of Miranda v. Arizona.10 6 The Tenth Circuit disagreed and con-
cluded that Scalf's fifth amendment rights had not been implicated be-
cause Sanchez' brief "conversation" with Scalf was nothing more than
an "on-the-scene" inquiry. 10 7 The court emphasized that Scalf was
neither under arrest, deprived of his freedom, nor questioned in a coer-
cive environment. 108
In deciding that Scalf's fifth amendment rights were not implicated,
the court relied on Cervantes v. Walker' 09 which involved a similar situa-
tion.'10 In Cervantes, the Ninth Circuit determined that the officer's
question was merely a spontaneous reaction and constituted "on-the-
scene" questioning rather than a Miranda-type interrogation. The
Tenth Circuit adopted the Ninth Circuit's "on-the-scene" language and
found that Scalf had not been subjected to a custodial interrogation re-
quiring Miranda warnings. I I 
C. Limited Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Compelled Production of
Documents
In re Grand Jury Proceedings"12 (Vargas II) further limited the fifth
amendment privilege as it applies to compulsory production of evidence
other than oral testimony. In Fisher v. United States," 3 the Supreme
Court found that a limited fifth amendment privilege applies to the pro-
duction of evidence in response to a subpoena."14 In Vargas II, the
Tenth Circuit determined that this limited privilege does not extend to
an attorney subpoenaed by a grand jury to produce the files of a
client. ' 15
Vargas II was an appeal from a contempt order entered against at-
torney Vargas for his continued refusal to produce the files of his client,
Sangre de Cristo Community Mental Health Service.' 1 6 In Vargas H,
105. Id. at 1272-73. Scalf's defense at trial was self-defense.
106. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
107. Scatf, 725 F.2d at 1276.
108. Id.
109. 589 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1978).
110. As a result of a fight with another inmate, Cervantes was being moved from one
cell to another. Pursuant to jail procedure, Cervantes was searched. One of the officers
found a matchbox which he thought contained marijuana and immediately questioned
Cervantes about it, to which Cervantes replied, "That's grass, man." Id. at 426-27.
111. Scatf, 725 F.2d at 1276.
112. 727 F.2d 941 (10th Cir. 1984).
113. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
114. Id. at 410.
115. Vargas II, 727 F.2d at 945 cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 90 (1984).
116. Id. at 942. In the initial proceeding, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Vargas, 723
F.2d 1461 (10th Cir. 1983) (hereinafter cited as Vargas I), Vargas and his client, Sangre de
Cristo, challenged a subpoena duces tecum from a giandjury investigating fraud involving
government grants to Sangre de Cristo. Vargas was also a target of the grand jury in
connection with alleged false or excessive billings to his client. In Vargas I, the Tenth
Circuit refused to reach the merits because the appeal was premature.
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Sangre de Cristo had dropped its earlier resistance to a subpoena and
ordered Vargas to turn its files over to the grand jury. Vargas refused,
as he was also the target of grand jury investigation in connection with
alleged false or excessive billings to his client, and he was held in con-
tempt by the trial court.' 17
On appeal, Vargas argued that the files were protected by the fifth
amendment privilege under Fisher v. United States, 1 8 or, in the alterna-
tive, by the attorney work-product privilege. 1 9 In support of his first
argument, Vargas stated that the compulsory surrender of his client files
would be an incriminating act because his possession of those files
would form a significant link in the government's proof of fraudulent
billings by Vargas to his client. 120 Despite Fisher, the Tenth Circuit
stated that it believed an analysis of the Supreme Court's cases showed
that the fifth amendment privilege regarding production of evidence
other than oral testimony is very weak. Fisher itself refused to extend the
privilege to the custodian of documents belonging to a corporation or
other collective entities.121
The Tenth Circuit found that the Supreme Court's emphasis in Bel-
lis v. United States1 2 2 on the ownership of the documents to be produced
applied in Vargas H. The court felt Vargas had held the files at issue in a
representative capacity for his client, Sangre de Cristo. Sangre de Cristo
had ownership rights to the files because it had paid Vargas for the
work. 12 3 The only interest Vargas had in the files was the right to be
paid for his work; he had no ownership or privacy interests. 124 As a
result, the court determined that an attorney ordered by a court to sur-
render client files at the request of the client is not protected by a fifth
amendment privilege. The court explicitly limited its holding to the sit-
uation where the client has directed its attorney to turn over the files. 1
2 5
III. SIXTH AMENDMENT
A. Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
The Tenth Circuit decided two conflicting cases concerning issues
117. Vargas H, 727 F.2d at 942.
118. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
119. The court rejected Vargas' attorney work product argument and cited Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), for the rule that an attorney's work product is protected only
if it was prepared in preparation for litigation. Because the Sangre de Cristo files were not
prepared in preparation for litigation, the court found they were not protected under Hick-
man. Vargas 11, 727 F.2d at 945-46.
120. 727 F.2d at 943.
121. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411.
122. 417 U.S. 85 (1974). The Court in Bellis held that an individual partner of a small
law partnership kept the firm's records in a representative capacity and could not assert a
fifth amendment privilege with reference to those documents. Id. at 100-01.
123. Vargas 11, 727 F.2d at 944.
124. Id. at 944-45.
125. Id. at 945. In an addendum to its opinion, written when the court affirmed the
Vargas H decision on rehearing, the Tenth Circuit stated that its decision in Vargas II is not
affected by United States v. Doe, 104 S. Ct. 1237 (1984), because Doe did not deal with a
person holding files in a representative capacity. Vargas H, 727 at 946.
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affecting a defendant's sixth amendment right to adequate assistance of
counsel, Rutledge v. Winans126 and United States v. Winkle. 12 7 Prior to
these decisions, the United States Supreme Court had not provided the
lower courts with a workable standard for determining whether the per-
formance of counsel constitutes reversible error. 128 The Tenth Circuit,
therefore, relied on its own standard, first advanced in the 1980 Dyer v.
Crisp decision.' 2 9 Shortly after the Tenth Circuit decided Rutledge and
Winkle, the Supreme Court decided Strickland v. Washington,130 which
clarified the appropriate standard for judging claims of ineffective assist-
ance of counsel.'
3 '
1. Background on Effective Assistance of Counsel Standards
The "farce and mockery" standard was the first standard used by
the circuit courts to determine whether a defendant received adequate
assistance of counsel. This standard, originally formulated by the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit in Diggs v. Welch, '3 2 required a showing that the
representation received by the defendant at trial "shocked the con-
science of the court" and made the trial "a farce and mockery of jus-
tice."' 13 3 The defendant had the burden of proving counsel had
adversely affected the defense, as well as the nature of the trial itself. All
eleven circuits had adopted this standard by 1970.134 The Fifth Circuit
126. No. 82-1606 (10th Cir. July 21, 1983) (attorney's failure to prepare and
investigate).
127. 722 F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1983) (attorney's conflict of interest).
128. Supreme Court cases have focused more on the extent of the sixth amendment
right to counsel, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963). However, in certain cases the Supreme Court has determined what is not
effective assistance of counsel. Counsel is not effective if the government places restraints
on the performance of counsel, Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), or if counsel
represents multiple defendants with conflicting interests. Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60 (1942); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
129. 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.) (reh'g en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980). "The
Sixth Amendment demands that defense counsel exercise the skill, judgment and diligence
of a reasonably competent defense attorney." Id. at 278.
130. 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
131. On the same day Strickland was decided, the Court handed down United States v.
Cronic, 104 S. Ct. 2039 (1984), which also addressed effective assistance of counsel. The
decision is discussed at length in a comment located at the end of this issue. In Cronic, the
Court discussed the situation in which the circumstances surrounding a trial make it un-
likely that counsel could have performed as an effective adversary. The Court held that
"only when surrounding circumstances justify a presumption of ineffectiveness can a sixth
amendment claim be sufficient without inquiry into counsel's actual performance at trial."
Id. at 2048.
132. 148 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945). This standard was
based on the fifth amendment due process clause which guarantees a defendant a fair trial,
as opposed to the sixth amendment right to counsel. Id.
133. Id. at 670; United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 950 (1950).
134. Bottiglio v. United States, 431 F.2d 930, 931 (1st Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Wil-
liams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 1965); Frand v. United States, 301 F.2d 102, 103
(10th Cir. 1962); O'Malley v. United States, 285 F.2d 733, 734 (6th Cir. 1961); In re Ernst,
294 F.2d 556, 558 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 917 (1961); Snead v. Smyth, 273 F.2d
838, 842 (4th Cir. 1959); Cofield v. United States, 263 F.2d 686, 689 (9th Cir.), revdper
curiam on other grounds, 360 U.S. 472 (1959);Johnston v. United States, 254 F.2d 239, 240
(8th Cir. 1958); United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338
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then revised the standard by defining the right to counsel as the right to
effective counsel-"counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering rea-
sonably effective assistance."'13 5 To date, every circuit has replaced its
"farce and mockery" standard with some form of the "reasonably effec-
tive assistance of counsel" standard.1
36
Under the current standard, a defendant generally must prove
counsel failed to meet the standard of care of a reasonably competent
attorney 13 7 and that the violation of the "reasonable assistance" stan-
dard prejudiced the defendant's trial in some way. 138 There is consider-
able conflict among the circuits concerning which party has the burden
of proof of prejudice.139 This conflict is manifested within the Tenth
Circuit in the Rutledge14 0 and Winkle14 1 tests. Each panel agreed that an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim must first satisfy the "reasonably
effective" standard set down in Dyer v. Crisp.142 Beyond this, however,
the panels diverged: the Rutledge court held that the government had
the burden of proving lack of prejudice, ' 43 while the Winkle court placed
the burden of proving prejudice on the defendant.144 This conflict was
U.S. 950 (1950); United States ex rel. Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976, 980-81 (7th Cir.
1948).
135. Caraway v. Beto, 421 F.2d 636, 637 (5th Cir. 1970) (quoting MacKenna v. Ellis,
280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960), modified, 289 F.2d 928 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
877 (1961)).
136. Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 155 (2d Cir. 1983) ("reasonably compe-
tent assistance"); Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11 th Cir. 1981) (en
banc) ("reasonably effective assistance"); Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275, 278 (10th Cir.)
(reh'g en banc) ("reasonably competent assistance"), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980);
Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc) ("reasonably compe-
tent and effective" assistance), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979); United States v. Bosch, 584
F.2d 1113, 1120-21 (1st Cir. 1978) ("reasonably competent assistance"); Marzullo v.
Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543-44 (4th Cir. 1977) ("normal competency"), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 1011 (1978); United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1976) ("customary
skill and diligence" of"a reasonably competent attorney"); United States ex rel. Williams v.
Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir.) ("minimum standard of professional representa-
tion"), cert. denied sub nom. Sielaffv. Williams, 423 U.S. 876 (1975); Beasley v. United States,
491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974) ("reasonably effective assistance"); United States v. De
Coster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("reasonably competent assistance"); Moore
v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3d Cir. 1970) (en banc) ("normal competency").
137. E.g., Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.) (reh'g en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
945 (1980).
138. E.g., United States v. Glick, 710 F.2d 639 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
995 (1984).
139. United States v. Baynes, 687 F.2d 659, 670 (3d Cir. 1982) (defendant must
demonstrate there is a "reasonable possibility" that had the error of which he or she com-
plains not occurred, the jury might have arrived at a different outcome); Taylor v. Starnes,
650 F.2d 38, 41 (4th Cir. 1981) (government has burden of proving counsel's errors were
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in order to avoid reversal).
140. No. 82-1606 (10th Cir. July 21, 1983).
141. 722 F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1983).
142. 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.) (reh'g en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980).
143. Rutledge, No. 82-1606, slip op. at 9 (citing United States v. Porterfield, 624 F.2d
122 (10th Cir. 1980)).
144. Winkle, 722 F.2d at 609 (citing United States v. Glick, 710 F.2d 639, 644 (10th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 995 (1984)). The court then noted that the particular claim at
issue in the case, conflict of interest, involves special considerations and concluded that if a
defendant shows his or her attorney's conflict of interest affected the adequacy of the rep-




recently resolved by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington. 1
45
2. The Supreme Court's Effective Assistance of Counsel
Standard
Strickland involved a claim that the defendant, Washington, received
ineffective assistance of counsel at his sentencing hearing.146 Washing-
ton had pled guilty to kidnapping, murder, robbery, breaking and enter-
ing, and assault charges14 7 and had been sentenced to death on each of
the three murder counts and to prison terms for the other counts.1
4 8
In arriving at a standard, the Supreme Court, perJustice O'Connor,
emphasized that the purpose of the constitutional right of effective
assistance of counsel is to ensure a fair trial.' 49 The Court then stated
that "[t]he benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be
whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced
a just result."' 150 The Court also set up a two-part test which must be
satisfied before a conviction will be reversed. First, the defendant must
show that his or her counsel's representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, measured by prevailing professional
norms.' 15 Second, the defendant must prove his or her counsel's defi-
cient performance prejudiced the defense such that the defendant was
deprived of a fair trial. 15 2 The court then stated that prejudice exists if
there is a reasonable probability that, absent counsel's errors, the fact
finder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting the defendant's
guilt. 153
145. 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
146. Id. at 2058. Washington claimed his counsel was ineffective because he failed to
request a psychiatric report, to investigate and prepare character witnesses, to seek a pre-
sentence investigation report, to present meaningful arguments to the sentencing judge,
and to investigate the medical examiner's reports or cross-examine the medical experts.
Id. at 2058, 2060.
147. Id. at 2057.
148. Id. at 2058.
149. Id. at 2064.
150. Id. The court noted that this standard also applies to a capital sentencing hearing,
like the one at issue in Stnchland, because it is "sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial
format and in the existence of standards for decision (citations omitted) that counsel's role
in the proceeding is comparable to counsel's role at trial-to ensure that the adversarial
testing process works to produce a just result under the standards governing decision."
id.
151. Id. at 2065.
152. Id. at 2064. The Court describes a fair trial as one whose result is reliable. Id.
153. Id. at 2069. This test is also used in determining the materiality of exculpatory
information not disclosed to the defense by the prosecution and in determining the mate-
riality of testimony made unavailable to the defense by government deportation of a wit-
ness. Id. at 2068.
The Court applied the facts of the Strichland case to its new standard and found that
Strickland could not prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim because his coun-
sel's strategy choice was well within the range of professional judgment. Id. at 2070-7 1.
Brennan concurred with the majority's opinion but, because he considers the death
penalty to constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment,
he dissented from the majority's judgment. Id. at 2071-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall dissented from both the majority's opinion and its judgment. He
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3. The Tenth Circuit Cases
Rutledge v. Winans154 came before the Tenth Circuit on a writ of
habeas corpus in which Rutledge claimed he had received ineffective
representation at trial. 15 5  Rutledge's claim was based on allegations
that his trial counsel did not properly investigate his case prior to trial
and was incompetent at trial.1
56
At the evidentiary hearing held on Rutledge's habeas corpus peti-
tion, testimony of Rutledge's trial counsel (counsel) contradicted the
testimony of both the co-defendant's trial counsel and the prosecutor
regarding Rutledge's trial representation. 157 Rutledge's counsel testi-
fied that he met and discussed the case at length with Rutledge and his
co-defendant's counsel. He also testified that co-defendant's counsel
made his pretrial preparation and investigation materials available to
him, that he discussed the case with co-defendant's counsel's investiga-
tor, and that he and co-defendant's counsel had agreed that co-defend-
ant's counsel would enter all the objections at trial.' 5 8 Although co-
defendant's counsel recalled talking on the phone with Rutledge's coun-
sel on several occasions, he denied sharing his materials with counsel,
using an investigator, and making an agreement with counsel regarding
objections at trial.15 9 Rutledge's counsel also testified that he reviewed
the prosecutor's file prior to trial. The prosecutor testified that he did
not recall meeting with counsel. He claimed his sole contact with coun-
sel was a fifteen minute phone conversation regarding a plea bargain
and arranging for Rutledge's return to jail prior to trial.160 Rutledge's
counsel admitted he did not remember interviewing any witnesses, pros-
ecution or defense, prior to trial.'
6 '
In United States v. Winkle, 16 2 Winkle was convicted of knowingly and
intentionally distributing methylphenidate and oxymorphone-two con-
objected to the standard adopted by the majority because "it is so malleable that, in prac-
tice, it will either have no grip at all or will yield excessive variation in the manner in which
the Sixth Amendment is interpreted and applied by different courts." Id. at 2075 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
Marshall also objected to the majority's prejudice standard. He felt a defendant
should be granted a new trial if it is shown that defendant's attorney departed from consti-
tutionally prescribed standards, regardless of whether the defendant suffered demonstra-
ble prejudice. Id. at 2077 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
154. No. 82-1606 (10th Cir. July 21, 1983).
155. Rutledge was convicted of trafficking in a controlled substance. Id., slip op. at 2.
156. Id. at 2-3. Rutledge claimed his trial counsel met with him only once for one hour,
did not attempt to locate any witnesses to testify on Rutledge's behalf, and did not inter-
view any of the government's prospective witnesses. Id. at 4. He also claimed his trial
counsel stipulated to the admission of crucial prosecution evidence, did not voir dire the
jury, did not deliver an opening statement, did not adequately cross-examine prosecution
witnesses at trial, delivered a damaging closing statement, and submitted ajury instruction
on the defense of entrapment without laying a foundation at trial for the defense. Id. at 3.




161. Id. at 5-6.
162. 722 F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1983).
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trolled substances.' 63 The prosecution's key witness at Winkle's trial
was Wood Lee Cox, the man who had helped police investigate Winkle.
During this investigation, Cox had asked Winkle to sell him the drugs
and then paid for them with $400 in marked bills supplied by the gov-
ernment. 164 Cox had previously worked for Winkle and had been in-
volved in litigation with him. Several of Winkle's witnesses testified that
Cox held a grudge against Winkle as a result of that litigation.165
On appeal, Winkle claimed, inter alia, that he was denied his sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The court found a
possible conflict of interest during the cross-examination of Cox by
Thompson, 166 Winkle's trial attorney, because Thompson had repre-
sented Cox in the previous litigation. During this cross-examination,
Thompson asked Cox if he had ever borrowed money from Winkle.
Cox said that he had not. Thompson then asked Cox how he had paid
his attorney (Thompson) in the earlier litigation. 16 7 An objection was
made as to the relevance of this question, and the attorneys approached
the bench. Thompson then told the judge that he had personal knowl-
edge that Cox had borrowed money from Winkle in order to pay
Thompson's bill. At that point, the judge stated that Thompson was
"getting close to some kind of a conflict."168 He did not see what the
borrowed money had to do with the case, told Thompson to drop the
subject, and sustained the objection.
169
4. Tenth Circuit Holdings Compared with Strickland
Both the Rutledge and the Winkle panels of the Tenth Circuit agreed
that the proper standard for reviewing an ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claim is found in Dyer v. Crisp. 170 On the issue of the burden of proof
of prejudice, however, the panels diverged. Both panels cited Tenth
Circuit cases as supporting their respective rules regarding the prejudice
required in an ineffective counsel claim. 17 1 Neither Rutledge nor Winkle
acknowledged that an opposing view on the prejudice requirement even
163. Id. at 608. Winkle was a horse trainer and owned a horse ranch. Apparently, the
drugs Winkle was convicted of selling could increase a horse's performance in a race. Id.
at 607.
164. Id. Prior to this transaction, Cox bought $20 worth of controlled substances from
Winkle. Although Cox was working for the police at the time of the sale, no charges were
filed against Winkle. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 610.
167. Id. at 613 (appendix). Through this questioning, Thompson sought to show that
Cox had borrowed $350 from Winkle in order to pay Thompson's legal fee for the prior
litigation. The court stated that this line of testimony could appear to support Winkle's
contention that the $400 was for repayment of the loan rather than for the purchase of
drugs. Id. at 610.
168. Id. at 614 (appendix).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 609. Rutledge, No. 82-1606, slip op. at 8.
171. Rutledge, No. 82-1606, slip op. at 9 (citing United States v. Porterfield, 624 F.2d
122 (10th Cir. 1980)); Winkle, 722 F.2d at 609 (citing United States v. Glick, 710 F.2d 639
(10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 995 (1984)).
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existed. Washington v. Strickland' 72 spared the Tenth Circuit from resolv-
ing its own inconsistency by specifically addressing this issue.
1 73
The Supreme Court in Strickland used the same approach as the
Winkle court. Strickland held that any deficiency in counsel's perform-
ance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court also held that the defendant
must affirmatively prove prejudice. 174 The Court, however, stated that
in some instances, prejudice will be presumed. This presumption ap-
plies only in the most extreme cases-where there has been actual or
constructive denial of counsel or affirmative state interference with
counsel's performance.17 5 There is also a more limited presumption of
prejudice when counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest.
17 6
The Court emphasized, though, that "[pirejudice is presumed only if
the defendant demonstrates that counsel actively represented conflict-
ing interests and that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his
lawyer's performance."' 77 The Tenth Circuit dealt with such a conflict
of interest in Winkle.
Although the Winkle court stated that a defendant must show preju-
dice in order to prove an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, it added
that special considerations apply when an attorney has a conflict of inter-
est. 178 The Tenth Circuit analyzed the situation in much the same way
the Supreme Court did in Strickland. First, the court cited Cuyler v. Sulli-
van 179 for the proposition that a defendant, who was subject to joint
representation at trial and showed that a conflict of interest actually af-
fected the adequacy of his representation, need not demonstrate preju-
dice in order to obtain relief.'8 0 The court recognized that joint
representation of co-defendants by one attorney may lead to conflicts
which compel an attorney to refrain from doing things he or she would
normally do in a case of single representation. 18 1 Citing Wood v. Geor-
gia, 182 the court determined that the Cuyler holding is not limited to con-
flicts arising from joint representation.' 83 The Winkle court concluded
that an actual conflict of interest would arise when defense counsel was
unable to effectively cross-examine a government witness because the
attorney had previously represented the witness.' 84 The court pointed
172. 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
173. See infra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
174. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2067.
175. Id. The Court felt that prejudice is so likely in these cases that a case-by-case
inquiry into prejudice would not be worth the cost. These cases involve easily identifiable
impairments of the sixth amendment right to counsel. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 350 (1980)).
178. Winkle, 722 F.2d at 609.
179. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
180. Winkle, 722 F.2d at 609.
181. Id.
182. 450 U.S. 261 (1981). In Wood, the Supreme Court found that inherent conflicts
arise when a defendant is represented by an attorney who is hired and paid by a third
party-particularly when the third party is the defendant's employer. Id. at 268-69.




out, again, that a conflict arises because an attorney feels compelled to
refrain from aggressively defending his or her client.' 8 5 In this situa-
tion, the defendant need not show prejudice to obtain relief.
18 6
The Tenth Circuit's Winkle opinion appears to conform with Strick-
land. Although the Supreme Court did not specifically state that its lim-
ited presumption of prejudice applies to all types of attorney conflicts of
interest, the generality of the Court's language seems to imply this
result. 187
The Rutledge court's approach to prejudice would not be approved
by the Supreme Court. Rutledge did not involve an actual or constructive
denial of counsel, affirmative state interference with counsel's represen-
tation, or an actual conflict of interest. In the absence of these types of
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Strickland requires the defendant
to prove prejudice.' 8 8 In fact, part of Strickland's ineffective assistance
of counsel claim was similar to Rutledge's claim-it centered around
Strickland's allegations that his attorney failed to investigate prior to his
sentencing hearing. 189 Contrary to the Tenth Circuit in Rutledge, the
Supreme Court required Strickland to show that any deficiencies arising
from a failure to investigate prejudiced the defense. 190 Moreover, the
Supreme Court did not suggest switching the burden of proof of preju-
dice to the government, once the defendant had shown counsel's repre-
sentation was inadequate, as an option under any circumstances. 19 1
5. Strickland's Impact on Tenth Circuit Ineffective Counsel
Claims
In Strickland, the Supreme Court stated that its holding should not
significantly affect the way the various circuits approach sixth amend-
ment ineffective assistance of counsel claims. "In particular, the minor
differences in the lower courts' precise formulations of the performance
standard are insignificant: the different formulations are mere variations
of the overarching reasonableness standard."' 19 2 In light of this lan-
185. Id.
186. Id. The court applied the facts to this standard and found that an actual conflict of
interest may have affected Winkle's trial counsel. Thompson was unable to effectively
cross-examine Cox because he had formerly represented Cox and certain attorney client
privileges may have applied. The court remanded the case for an inquiry into the exist-
ence of a conflict of interest. Id. at 610-12.
187. Se supra text accompanying notes 174-77.
188. 104 S. Ct. at 2067.
189. Id. at 2058.
190. Id. at 2071.
191. It seems unlikely, though, that the Supreme Court would dispute the Tenth Cir-
cuit's finding that Rutledge received inadequate trial representation. In Strickland, the
Supreme Court stated that an inquiry into counsel's conversations with the defendant may
be critical to a proper assessment of counsel's investigation decisions. Id. at 2066-67. In
Rutledge, though, counsel only briefly discussed the case with the defendant. He also failed
to interview any witnesses. Rutledge, No. 82-1606, slip op. at 4, 9.
192. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2069. Justice Brennan emphasized this point in his concur-
ring opinion by stating that the majority's suggestion that its decision is largely consistent
with the approach taken by the lower courts "simply indicates that those courts may con-
tinue to develop governing principles on a case-by-case basis in the common law tradition,
1984]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
guage, it is unlikely that Strickland will drastically change the Tenth Cir-
cuit's approach to ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Dyer is likely
to remain the definitive case in the Tenth Circuit in this area.
193
B. Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel
In Nees v. Bishop, 194 a civil action, Nees claimed Bishop, a special
agent for the FBI, and five other defendants violated his sixth amend-
ment right to counsel during critical stages of both a state and federal
investigation.19 5
On March 30, 1976, Nees was arrested by Bishop and booked into
the La Plata County jail in Durango. 19 6 Prior to his arrest, Nees had
been questioned by Wiggins of the Durango Police Department and by
Bishop. At that time, Nees signed a form which waived his right to "a
lawyer at this time."' 9 7 After Nees was arrested, Bishop obtained per-
mission from the United States Attorney in Denver to charge Nees with
extortion under the Hobbs Act. Nees then signed a second form waiv-
ing his right to "a lawyer at this time."' 198 After a search of Nees' hotel
room, 19 9 he became a suspect in a state criminal investigation.
200
Sometime during the evening of March 30th, a note was posted at
the La Plata County jail which stated: "Nees is to be kept alone (Sheriffs
Orders). He has no bond and he is not to be seen by the Public De-
fender. Bishop says that he has to have his own private attorney."
20 1
During the morning of March 31 st, Nees asked the jail commander
if he could see an attorney and was informed that he could not. Later
that day, Nees was booked on a state charge of armed robbery. That
evening the state public defender, David West, requested to see Nees,
but based on the note the jailer on duty refused the request.
20 2
On April I st, Nees was taken for his initial appearance before a fed-
eral magistrate. Nees did not request an attorney at that time. Public
defender West again requested to see Nees but was refused permission,
as they have in the past." Id. at 2073 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
193. Dyer, 613 F.2d 275, 278 (10th Cir. 1980) (reh'g en banc).
194. 730 F.2d 606 (10th Cir. 1984).
195. Id. at 607. Nees' suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), but, as to
Bishop, the district court determined that the cause would be construed under Bivens v.
Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), as a suit for money damages
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). Nees v. Bishop, 524 F. Supp. 1310, 1311 (D. Colo. 1981).
196. Nees, 730 F.2d at 608.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Shortly after Nees signed his second waiver of attorney, Nees gave the police writ-
ten permission to search his room at the Silver Spruce Motel in Durango. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. There was considerable debate at trial concerning whether Bishop posted the
note or authorized it to be posted. See id. at 608-09. The district court found, though, that
the following (referring to the testimony of Sheriff Schilthius) was credible: "Agent
Bishop told him on the night of plaintiff's arrest that the public defender was not to see
plaintiff... Schilthius passed this information to Prouty who wrote and posted the note."
.ees, 524 F. Supp. at 1312.
202. Nees, 730 F.2d at 609.
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this time by the jail commander. Later that afternoon West was asked to
represent Nees at a lineup, which he did. On April 2nd, West appeared
with Nees in the Durango District Court on the state armed robbery
charges. On April 3rd, Nees was taken to the Denver County Jail, and
on April 5th, Nees saw a federal magistrate who made arrangements for
a federal public defender to represent Nees.
2 0 3
In deciding whether Nees' sixth amendment right to counsel had
been violated, the Tenth Circuit considered whether adversary judicial
proceedings had been initiated against Nees, and if so, whether Nees
was denied counsel during a "critical stage" of those proceedings.
20 4
The Tenth Circuit quoted Kirby v. Illinois 205 as setting out the start-
ing point in determining when a person is entitled to the aid of an attor-
ney: "It has been firmly established that a person's Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the
time adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him."
'20 6
The Tenth Circuit also noted that United States v. Ash 20 7 added the re-
quirement that a proceeding which occurred after the initiation of adver-
sary judicial proceedings must be a "critical stage" in order to
necessitate the presence of counsel.
20 8
Although the court expressed concern over the "inconceivable and
unreasonable" instructions given by Bishop 20 9 and the fact that Nees
had been in jail for two days without being permitted to see a public
defender, 2 10 the court determined that Nees' sixth amendment rights
had not been violated. 2 11 In reaching that conclusion, the court found
that Nees' right to counsel had not attached at the time he asked to see
an attorney because judicial proceedings had not begun against Nees,
2 12
nor was he being interrogated, 2 13 nor was he at a critical stage of the
proceedings. 2 14 The court found that Nees was represented by counsel
at critical stages of the proceedings, such as the lineup on April 1st and
the initial state proceedings on April 2nd.2 '5 The court also found that
203. Id.
204. Id. at 611. The Tenth Circuit considered only whether Nees was denied his right
to counsel in connection with his state charges because, during his testimony at trial, Nees
specifically limited his complaint to the state charges. Id. at 611 n.2.
205. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
206. Id. at 688.
207. 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
208. Nees, 730 F.2d at 611 (citing Ash, 413 U.S. at 306-21).
209. Mees. 730 F.2d at 611.
210. Id. at611-12.
211. Id. at 612.
212. Id. at 612-13.
213. Id. at 612. Because Nees was not interrogated during the time he was held in jail
without access to counsel, the Tenth Circuit found that Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964), did not apply. In Escobedo. the Supreme Court held that confessions obtained from
the defendant during extensive interrogation were not admissible into evidence because
the defendant had been denied access to an attorney. Even though judicial proceedings
had not been initiated, the police had begun to focus on the defendant as a suspect. Esco-
bedo, 378 U.S. at 490-91.
214. Nees, 730 F.2d at 612.
215. Id. at 613.
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Bishop's instructions, although clearly improper, did not violate the
sixth amendment.
2 16
The court's decision in Nees is consistent with the analysis of
Kirby2 17 and Ash 2 18 as well as the more recent decision of United States v.
Gouveia.2 19 Nees shows that the Supreme Court's position on the timing
of the attachment of the right to counsel is subject to abuse. Although
strictly speaking Nees was not unconstitutionally denied counsel nor was
he interrogated during his two days without counsel, he did give up im-
portant constitutional rights during that time. Nees signed two waivers
of his right to counsel, as well as consents to search his truck and his
motel room.
2 20
Certain questions are left unanswered by the Supreme Court and
the Nees decision. At what point prior to a defendant's first appearance
in adversarial proceedings is the defendant entitled to meet with coun-
sel? If the right attaches only immediately prior to this first appearance,
the right to counsel at this appearance may be meaningless without ade-
quate consultation time.
2 2 1
C. Sixth Amendment Right to a Jury
In Haar v. Hanrahan,22 2 Haar was tried by a jury in the magistrate
court of Bernalillo County, New Mexico and was found guilty of simple
battery and criminal damage to property.2 2 3 The magistrate imposed
216. Id.
217. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
218. 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
219. 104 S. Ct. 2292 (1984). In Gouveia, six inmates were placed in administrative seg-
regation pending investigation of the murders of two inmates. Four of the inmates re-
mained in segregation without appointed counsel for approximately 19 months while the
other two were in segregation for eight months without appointed counsel. All six inmates
were appointed counsel at their respective arraignments. d. at 2295-96.
Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, reaffirmed the Supreme Court's prior holdings
that the right to counsel attaches only at or after the initiation of adversarial judicial pro-
ceedings which in this case occurred at the arraignments of the defendants. Id. at 2297.
In his concurring opinionJustice Stevens disagreed with the majority's statement that
the right to counsel attaches only after the initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings. Id.
at 2300 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Stevens felt that if authorities take a
person into custody to interrogate or to otherwise facilitate building a case against him or
her, the person is sufficiently "accused" to be entitled to counsel even though formal
charges have not been filed. Id. at 2302 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964)). Stevens stated, though, that the defend-
ants' administrative segregation did not serve an accusatorial function and, thus, con-
curred with the majority's judgment. Id. at 2303.
Justice Marshall dissented based on his finding that the administrative segregation did
serve an accusatorial function. Id. at 2304 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
220. Nees, 730 F.2d at 608.
221. In Nees, the defendant was denied access to a public defender. See Nees, 730 F.2d
at 607, 609. In Gouveia,Justice Rehnquist seemed to imply that the defendants had a right
to retain and consult with private counsel prior to the initiation of adversarial proceedings.
Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2296, n.l.
222. 708 F.2d 1547 (10th Cir. 1983).
223. Id. at 1547-48. The criminal damage to property charge carried a maximum sen-
tence of six-months imprisonment. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-6(C) (1978). Haar was
originally charged with aggravated battery, which carries a maximum penalty of one year's
imprisonment, but was acquitted on that charge and found guilty of the lesser included
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two consecutive 90-day prison terms. 224 Haar exercised his right to ap-
peal through a trial de novo in the district court. 22 5 The district court
denied Haar's request that his case be reheard by a jury and reconvicted
him. The district court, though, sentenced Haar to two concurrent six-
month prison terms.
22 6
In the New Mexico Court of Appeals, Haar argued that he was enti-
tled to a jury at his trial de novo in the district court. 22 7 The court of
appeals rejected this argument based on its finding that the local court
rules prohibit the district court from imposing a sentence in excess of
that imposed by the magistrate. 2 28 The court of appeals reasoned that,
because Haar was subjected to no greater jeopardy in the de novo pro-
ceedings than in the magistrate court, he was not entitled to a jury in the
district court. 2 29 The court of appeals did, though, remand for proper
sentencing because it felt the two concurrent six-month sentences im-
posed by the district court were an impermissible enhancement of the
two consecutive ninety-day sentences.
2 30
After Haar's petitions to both the New Mexico Supreme Court and
United States Supreme Court were rejected, 2 3 1 he filed a petition for
habeas corpus. In this petition, Haar argued he was entitled to a jury
trial in the district court because he had been subjected to an aggregate
penalty in excess of six-months imprisonment upon conviction of two
crimes arising out of the same act.
23 2
The Tenth Circuit accepted Haar's argument but, based on the
facts, decided it did not justify a reversal of Haar's conviction. First, the
court outlined the sixth amendment right to jury trial. 2 33 In doing so,
the court emphasized that there is no right to a jury trial for prosecu-
tions of petty crimes. 23 4 The court then cited Baldwin v. New York 2 35 as
drawing the line between petty crimes and serious offenses. Baldwin de-
fined a serious offense as any crime in which a defendant faces a prison
sentence in excess of six months.23 6 Next, the court applied United States
v. Potvin,23 7 which stated that multiple charges, even though petty, can
offense of simple battery, which carries a maximum penalty of six-months imprisonment.
See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-1-6(B) and (C) (1978).
224. Haar, 708 F.2d at 1548.
225. Id. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 35-13-2 (1978) (amended 1981).
226. Haar, 708 F.2d at 1548.
227. State v. Haar, 94 N.M. 539, 540, 612 P.2d 1350, 1351 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).
228. Id. at 540-41, 612 P.2d at 1351-52.
229. Id. at 540, 612 P.2d at 1351. The New Mexico Court of Appeals also noted that
Haar's acquittal on the aggravated battery charge prohibited the state from re-prosecuting
him on that charge in the district court. Id. at 541, 612 P.2d at 1352.
230. Id. at 542, 612 P.2d at 1353. Upon remand, Haar was sentenced to two concur-
rent ninety-day terms. Haar v. Hanrahan, 708 F.2d at 1548.
231. Haar v. State, 94 N.M. 674, 615 P.2d 991 (1980); Haar v. State, 449 U.S. 1063
(1980).
232. Haar v. Hanrahan, 708 F.2d at 1548.
233. Id. at 1548-49.
234. Id. at 1549 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968)).
235. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
236. laar, 708 F.2d at 1549 (citing Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 69).
237. 481 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1973).
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threaten a defendant with the consequences of a serious crime.
23 8
Based on Potvin, the Tenth Circuit found that Baldwin's definition of a
serious offense may not always protect a defendant from an oppressive
prosecution. 2 39 The threat of governmental oppression is greater with
aggregate penalties because of the increased possibility of a long sen-
tence.2 40 As a result, the Tenth Circuit determined that a court must
look at the aggregate penalty that could arise out of a discrete criminal
transaction in order to determine whether a defendant has a right to a
jury trial.
2 4 '
The remaining question for the Tenth Circuit in Haar was whether
the right to a jury trial should be based on the potential penalties faced
by a defendant according to the statutory definitions of the crimes, or
whether it should be based on the actual penalties faced by the
defendant.
2 42
The court discussed an objective and subjective approach in reach-
ing a solution to this issue. Under the objective approach, the right to a
jury would be based on the potential aggregate penalty allowable under
statute upon conviction of multiple petty crimes arising out of the same
criminal act. 24 3 Alternatively, the subjective approach would focus on
the aggregate penalty actually faced by the defendant. Under this ap-
proach, a defendant would be entitled to a jury trial only when he or she
was actually threatened with a serious penalty. 24 4 The court felt that the
subjective approach was adequate because it ensures a jury trial in all
cases where a defendant is actually threatened by a serious penalty, re-
gardless of the objective seriousness of the individual charges.2 45 The
court seemed to be uneasy with its choice between the objective and
subjective approaches; neither approach squared with Duncan v. Louisi-
ana24 6 and Baldwin v. New York 2 47 because those cases did not deal with
aggregate penalties. 2 48 In the end, the court settled on the subjective
approach because it felt the Supreme Court, rather than the Tenth Cir-
cuit, is the proper court to broaden the scope of the sixth amend-
ment.2 49 Haar's holding that a defendant is entitled to a jury trial only if
actually threatened at the commencement of trial with an aggregate po-
tential penalty of greater than six-months imprisonment limits the im-
pact of Potvin and yet leaves it with plenty of vitality. Because Haar was
238. Id. at 382.
239. Haar v. Hanrahan, 708 F.2d at 1551.
240. Id. at 1551 n.17.
241. Id. at 1551.
242. Id. at 1552.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. The court stated that this "approach thus protects the defendant from vindic-
tive prosecution, interposing the jury between the government and the defendant in all
cases where there is a risk of serious punishment and a consequent possibility of
prosecutorial abuse." Id.
246. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
247. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).




subject to a maximum penalty in the trial de novo of only 180-days im-
prisonment, the Tenth Circuit found that he was not entitled to a jury
trial.
250
IV. DISMISSAL OF INDICTMENT WITHOUT PREJUDICE: PROSECUTION'S
REQUIREMENT TO SHOW CAUSE
United States v. Derr25 1 determined the circumstances under which
an indictment may be dismissed without prejudice at the government's
request prior to trial. In May 1980, Derr was indicted on six counts of
bank embezzlement and six counts of making false entries in bank ac-
counts. 252 On the day of trial, the government moved to dismiss the
indictment without prejudice. Derr objected, stating that she was ready
for trial and arguing that the government had not stated any legitimate
or compelling reasons for dismissing the indictment without prejudice
at that late date. The district court summarily dismissed the indictment
over Derr's objections.
25 3
In November 1982, Derr was reindicted on the same charges. Derr
moved to dismiss the second indictment, arguing that the trial court
erred in dismissing the original indictment without prejudice because it
had not first determined the government's reasons for dismissal. The
trial court agreed that it had abused its discretion and then dismissed
the second indictment with prejudice.
25 4
In determining whether the trial court had properly dismissed the
second indictment, the Tenth Circuit discussed the purposes behind
Rule 48(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2 5 5 which allows
a prosecutor to dismiss an indictment at anytime, except during trial, if
he or she obtains "leave of court." The court determined that the pri-
mary purpose of the "leave of court" requirement is to prevent harass-
ment of a defendant by charging, dismissing, and recharging the
defendant with a crime. In order to avoid this harassment and to create
a reviewable record, the trial court must at least know the prosecutor's
reasons for seeking to dismiss the indictment and the facts underlying
the prosecutor's decision.
2 56
The court then determined that the trial court's remedy of dismissal
with prejudice was proper because it is the only remedy that would effec-
tuate Rule 48(a). The government's reason for dismissing the first in-
dictment, which was to allow itself more time to investigate, was not
sufficient, because the request came on the day of trial and Derr ob-
250. Id. at 1553-54.
251. 726 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1984).
252. Id. at 618.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a) provides: "By attorney for government. The Attorney
General or the United States attorney may by leave of court file a dismissal of an indict-
ment, information or complaint and the prosecution shall thereupon terminate. Such a
dismissal may not be filed during the trial without the consent of the defendant."
256. Derr, 726 F.2d at 619.
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jected to the request. If the trial court had properly denied the govern-
ment's request, the prosecutor's only alternatives would have been to go
ahead with trial or to dismiss the indictment with prejudice.
25 7
V. APPLICATION OF STATE WIRETAP STATUTES IN FEDERAL COURTS
United States v. McNulty25 8 determined the circumstances under
which evidence obtained pursuant to a state authorized and conducted
wiretap may be admissible into evidence in a federal prosecution.
The federal wiretap statute 259 permits the principal prosecuting at-
torney of any state to apply for and use a state wiretap, provided the
wiretap conforms with the federal statute and the applicable state stat-
ute.260 The Tenth Circuit, en banc, interpreted this requirement as per-
mitting receipt of state authorized wiretap evidence in federal
prosecutions only if the state wiretap complied with both the federal and
state statutes.2 6 1 As a result, the court determined that state statutory
wiretap requirements which are stricter than their federal counterparts
must be complied with in order for the evidence to be used in federal
court, 2 62 even though the evidence would have been admissible had it
been obtained with a federal wiretap.
2 63
The court went on to distinguish two types of cases which imply a
different conclusion. The first type 26 4 involves the distinction between
interception and preservation. The court reasoned that because the
purpose of a wiretap statute is to protect an individual's privacy, only
those requirements of a state statute pertaining to interception must be
complied with in order to allow the evidence into federal court. Preser-
vation of evidence obtained by wiretap does not affect an individual's
privacy and, thus, less stringent federal requirements are acceptable. 26 5
The second type of distinguishable case 26 6 involves the use of warrant-
less wiretaps with one participant's consent. Citing its own case, United
257. Id.
258. 729 F.2d 1243, 1264 (1984) (reh'g en banc).
259. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Title Il, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-20 (1982).
260. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (1982). The pertinent part of the statute states:
The principal prosecuting attorney of any State, or the principal prosecuting at-
torney of any political subdivision thereof, if such attorney is authorized by a stat-
ute of that State to make application to a State court judge of competent
jurisdiction for an order authorizing or approving the interception of wire or oral
communications, may apply to such judge for, and such judge may grant in con-
formity with section 2518 of this chapter and with the applicable State statute an
order authorizing, or approving the interception of wire or oral communications.
261. 729 F.2d at 1264.
262. Id. (quoting United States v. Marion, 535 F.2d 697, 702 (2d Cir. 1976)).
263. 729 F.2d at 1264.
264. United States v. Vazquez, 605 F.2d 1269 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981
(1979), 444 U.S. 1019 (1980); United States v. Sotomayor, 592 F.2d 1219 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 919 (1979).
265. 729 F.2d at 1265 (quoting Sotomayor, 592 F.2d at 1225-26).
266. United States v. Horton, 601 F.2d 319 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 937 (1979);
United States v. Nelligan, 573 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Shaffer, 520 F.2d
1369 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976); United States v. Neville, 516 F.2d
1302 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925 (1975).
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States v. Hall,2 6 7 the court determined that the federal wiretap statute 268
specifically permits the warrantless use of a wiretap if one participant
consents and, thus, the federal statute controls over any conflicting state
statutes.
2 69
Having decided that a more stringent state wiretap statute must be
complied with in order to allow evidence obtained by a state wiretap into
federal court, the court determined that, in this case, Colorado's wiretap
statute 270 had not been complied with 2 7 1 and, thus, the evidence could
not be used in federal court. Judge Logan, joined by Judges Barrett and
Doyle, dissented from the majority's interpretation of the Colorado
wiretap statute, but agreed that any stricter state requirements must be
complied with in order to allow state wiretap evidence into federal
court.
2 7 2
VI. PAROLE EXTENSION: "THE FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS STANDARD"
United States v. Ortiz273 involved extension of probation based on a
defendant's failure to pay a fine imposed as part of a sentence. Ortiz
pled guilty to offering to sell and selling parts of the bodies of golden
eagles. Ortiz was sentenced to two years probation and fined $650, to
be paid in installments. 2 74 At the end of Ortiz' probation period, the
Federal Probation Office petitioned for an extension because Ortiz had
paid only $75. The petition was granted and Ortiz' probation was ex-
tended two years.
2 75
On appeal, Ortiz argued that the extension of his probation violated
equal protection because, in effect, it punished him for being poor.
2 7 6
The court found that Ortiz had made efforts to pay the fine but his finan-
cial responsibilities and his chronic lack of employment prevented him
267. 536 F.2d 313, 327 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976).
268. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c).
269. 729 F.2d at 1266. The Tenth Circuit also distinguished United States v. Hall, 543
F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977) which it felt did not fit within
either of the other two categories. The court stated:
In United States v. Hall. . . a properly authorizedfederal wiretap produced infor-
mation about transportation of heroin. State officials were notified and they
made a warrantless search of the defendant and seized the heroin. The Ninth
Circuit refused to apply the California provision forbidding the use of the fruits of
wiretap information by state police. In that case, however, the issue was solely
one of admissibility of evidence obtained subsequent to a validly authorized wiretap.
The court there recognized that state standards would have been applicable had
the evidence been obtained by state officers for state prosecution in violation of a
state statute.
McNulty, 729 F.2d at 1266.
270. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-15-102 (1978).
271. 729 F.2d at 1267-68. The court interpreted the Colorado wiretap statute as al-
lowing authorization of a wiretap only for investigation of certain enumerated crimes.
Three of the offenses listed in the affidavit to obtain the wiretap were not included among
these enumerated crimes. Therefore, the court found the wiretap invalid under the Colo-
rado statute. Id.
272. Id. at 1269-70 (Logan, J., dissenting).
273. 733 F.2d 1416 (10th Cir. 1984).
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from paying in full. 27 7
The court then determined, based on the fundamental fairness
standard enunciated in Bearden v. Georgia,278 that the extension of proba-
tion based on Ortiz' failure to pay his fine was not unconstitutional.
2 79
In Bearden, the Supreme Court held that the revocation of a person's
probation for failure to pay a fine violates the fundamental fairness re-
quired by the fourteenth amendment unless the person has not made
bona fide attempts to pay the fine and adequate alternative types of pun-
ishment do not exist. 280 The Tenth Circuit felt that extension of proba-
tion for failure to pay a fine is far different from imprisonment for failure
to pay a fine, as there is a much milder loss of liberty involved in proba-
tion extension. 28 ' A district court has wide latitude to extend probation
based on what is in the "best interest of society."'2 8 2 The court also
found the extension of probation acceptable because Bearden seemed to
contemplate this type of solution in requiring alternative forms of pun-
ishment, other than imprisonment, for failure to pay a fine.2 83
VII. TIME CREDITED ON SENTENCE
In United States v. Baez, 284 the Tenth Circuit determined whether a
district court has the power to deny a defendant credit for time spent in
custody under charges other than those to which the defendant pled
guilty. In February 1982, Baez was found guilty of various violations of
the Controlled Substance Act.2 8 5 On appeal these convictions were re-
versed.2 8 6 Upon remand, Baez agreed to plead guilty to misprison of
felony in return for dismissal of the indictment.287 At this point Baez
had been in custody for 19 months in connection with the drug
charges. 28 8 Baez was sentenced to three years imprisonment and was
fined $500, the maximum penalty for misprison of felony. The district
court refused to credit Baez with his time spent in custody, but directed
him to appeal that ruling.
2 8 9
The Tenth Circuit found that the controlling statute 290 delegated to
277. Id.
278. 103 S. Ct. 2064 (1983).
279. 733 F.2d at 1418.
280. Bearden, 103 S. Ct. at 2070-71.
281. Ortiz, 733 F.2d at 1417-18.
282. Id. at 1418 (quoting United States v. Chancey, 695 F.2d 1275, 1277 (11th Cir.
1982)).
283. Ortiz, 733 F.2d at 1418.
284. 732 F.2d 780 (10th Cir. 1984).
285. Id. at 781. Baez was convicted of conspiracy to possess PCP with intent to dis-
tribute and use of a communication facility to distribute PCP. Id.
286. United States v. Baez, 703 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1983).
287. Baez, 732 F.2d at 781.
288. Id.
289. Id. The Tenth Circuit noted that ordinarily there is no right of appeal from a
guilty plea. In this instance, though, the court took jurisdiction in order to correct an
illegal sentence. Id.
290. 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1983). The pertinent part of the statute states:
The sentence of imprisonment of any person convicted of an offense shall com-
mence to run from the date on which such person is received at the penitentiary,
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the Attorney General the initial discretion to determine the credit to be
given a defendant for time spent in custody prior to sentencing. As a
result, the district court's order refusing to grant Baez credit for the 19
months he spent in custody was beyond its jurisdiction. 2 9 1 The Tenth
Circuit also found that Baez should not be denied credit for his time
spent in custody solely because misprison of felony is not a lesser in-
cluded offense of his drug charges. Under the statute, the Attorney
General is to give credit on a sentence to a prisoner for time spent in
custody in connection with the offense or acts for which the sentence
was imposed.2 9 2 Baez' guilty plea to misprison of felony was based on
acts committed within the greater drug offense;2 9 3 thus, the court im-
plied that Baez should be granted credit for the 19 months he spent in
custody.
VIII. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BASED ON RECANTED TESTIMONY
In United States v. Ramsey, 2 94 Ramsey was convicted of conspiring to
damage and destroy a building by use of explosives. 29 5 At Ramsey's
trial, the government's key witness, Jackson, testified that Ramsey had
hired him and two others to break into and destroy the building. 29 6 Af-
ter Ramsey had been convicted, Jackson executed an affidavit recanting
his trial testimony and stating that he had burned down the building
because Ramsey owed him money. Jackson's affidavit was corroborated
by an affidavit executed by his wife. 2 9 7 Ramsey requested a new trial
based on the newly discovered evidence of perjured testimony. The
trial court denied his motion for a new trial without a hearing and with-
out any findings of fact.
2 9 8
In an opinion written by Judge Logan, the Tenth Circuit remanded
the case for a hearing on the credibility of Jackson's repudiation of his
trial testimony. 2 99 The court listed the requirements necessary to ob-
tain a new trial based on recanted testimony30 0 and stated that three of
reformatory, orjail for service of such sentence. The Attorney General shall give
any such person credit toward service of his sentence for any days spent in cus-
tody in connection with the offense or acts for which sentence was imposed.
291. Baez, 732 F.2d at 782-83.
292. Id. at 782.
293. Id. The court explained that misprison of felony contains four elements: (1) com-
mission of the felony alleged; (2) the accused had full knowledge of the fact; (3) the ac-
cused failed to notify authorities; and (4) the accused took an affirmative step to conceal
the crime. By pleading guilty, Baez admitted all of these elements. Id.
294. 726 F.2d 601 (10th Cir. 1984).
295. Id. at 602.
296. Id. at 603.
297. Id. at 604.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 605.
300. Id. at 604. The court quoted United States v. Allen, 554 F.2d 398, 403 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 836 (1977) for these requirements:
The newly discovered evidence must be more than impeaching or cumulative; it
must be material to the issues involved; it must be such as would probably pro-
duce an acquittal; and a new trial is not warranted by evidence which, with rea-
sonable diligence, could have been discovered and produced at trial.
Allen, 554 F.2d at 403.
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the four requirements were undisputably satisfied in this case.3 0 ' First,
the recantation was not merely cumulative because presumably Jackson
would testify to the new version at trial. Second, the court stated that
the materiality of the recantation could not seriously be disputed; Jack-
son was the government's chief witness, was the only conspirator who
spoke with Ramsey, and was the only conspirator who received money
from Ramsey. Third, the court noted that it was unrealistic to assume
that Ramsey's attorneys could have elicited the recantation during cross-
examination. The only requirement open to dispute, according to the
court, was whether the recantation would probably produce an acquittal.
The court felt this requirement hinged on the credibility of Jackson's
recantation. 30 2 The Tenth Circuit determined that the case should be
remanded to the district court for a determination of the credibility of
Jackson's recantation; if the district court were to find that the recanta-
tion was credible, it should grant a new trial. The court cautioned,
though, that a recantation is properly viewed with suspicion.3 03 Never-
theless, the court determined that the district court's denial of Ramsey's
motion for a new trial without a hearing or written findings was an abuse
of discretion.
30 4
Judge McKay both concurred with and dissented from the majority
opinion.30 5 McKay agreed with the majority's finding that the trial court
must at least set forth reasons for denying a new trial based on the re-
cantation of a critical witness's trial testimony. He dissented, however,
from the majority's treatment of the recanted testimony. McKay was
particularly troubled by the majority's failure to give the trial court any
directions for the exercise of its discretion in granting a new trial based
on recanted testimony.
30 6
McKay felt that where the testimony recanted is that of a critical
witness, great danger lies in allowing the verdict to stand even when the
recantation is subsequently recanted.3 0 7 In this case, there was particu-
lar reason to be suspicious of the witness's testimony; Jackson was ad-
mittedly guilty of the crime, and he had great motivation to lie because
his attorney had told him he could get the "needle" or spend a long
time in the pen unless he went along with the government. 30 8 Under
these circumstances, McKay felt it was not appropriate to treat the re-
canted testimony with suspicion.
30 9
301. Ramsey, 726 F.2d at 604.
302. Id. at 605.
303. Id. (citing United States v. Ahern, 612 F.2d 507, 509 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1093 (1981). The court also noted that the government's brief alleged that Jack-
son had withdrawn his recantation. 726 F.2d at 605.
304. 726 F.2d at 605.
305. Id. (McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
306. Id.





IX. FAILURE TO INSTRUCT ON LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE
In Fitzgerald v. United States,3 10 Fitzgerald was convicted of posses-
sion of a controlled substance with intent to distribute.3 1 1 The Tenth
Circuit refused to reverse the conviction despite Fitzgerald's contention
that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser in-
cluded offense of simple possession of narcotics.3 12 The court acknowl-
edged that Sansone v. United States3 13 held that if there is a lesser
included offense, the defendant is entitled to a jury instruction if the
evidence warrants it. 3 14 The court determined, though, that because
there was a "surprising lack of evidence supporting a mere possession
charge" 3 15 and because the evidence did support the possession with
intent to distribute charges, it would not remand for a new trial.
3 16
At trial, the evidence showed that Fitzgerald possessed weighing
scales and $18,400 worth of drugs,3 17 that Fitzgerald moved freely in
and out of the rooms of his co-defendants Peterson and Mason, that
there was a considerable amount of public traffic to and from the motel
rooms of all three,3 18 and that $11,000 worth of drugs were seized from
Mason's room.
3 19
In Sansone, the Supreme Court stated that a lesser included offense
instruction is only proper if the charged greater offense requires the jury
to find a disputed factual element which is not required for conviction of
the lesser included offense. 3 20 The Tenth Circuit's approval of the trial
court's failure to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of sim-
ple possession indicates that it felt Fitzgerald's intent to distribute was
not in dispute or that the jury could not rationally have convicted Fitz-
gerald of simple possession as opposed to possession with intent to
distribute.
Interestingly, in a somewhat similar case, the Fourth Circuit re-
versed a conviction for failure to grant a lesser included offense instruc-
tion. 32 1 In United States v. Levy, despite the fact that Levy was arrested
with a convicted drug trafficker and 4.75 ounces of 95% pure cocaine
with a potential street value of $35,000 in his car, the Fourth Circuit felt
310. 719 F.2d 1069 (10th Cir. 1983).
311. Id. at 1070.
312. Id. at 1071-72.
313. 380 U.S. 343 (1965).
314. 7!9 F.2d at 1071 (citing Sansone, 380 U.S. at 349).
315. 719 F.2d at 1072.
316. Id. at 1071-72.
317. Id. at 1070. Approximately 25 grams of 47% pure cocaine and 33 grams of 70%
pure amphetamine were seized by the police from Fitzgerald's motel room. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Sansone, 380 U.S. at 350. The Tenth Circuit listed four requirements as necessary
for an instruction on a lesser included offense: "(1) a proper request; (2) the lesser in-
cluded offense consists of some, but not all, of the elements of the offense charged; (3) the
element differentiating the two offenses is a matter in dispute; (4) a jury could rationally
convict the defendant of the lesser offense and acquit of the greater offense." Fitzgerald,
719 F.2d at 1071.
321. United States v. Levy, 703 F.2d 791, 793 (4th Cir. 1983).
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there was a reasonable possibility the jury might infer the cocaine was
for Levy's personal use.3 2 2 The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the
value and potential doses (1,300) of the cocaine were substantial,3 23 but
felt that they might merely reflect the costly nature of the habit and that
4.75 ounces of cocaine were not necessarily an amount that would ex-
ceed what one would stockpile for personal use.
Levy and Fitzgerald demonstrate that whether or not a lesser in-
cluded offense instruction on simple possession will be required in trials
involving large quantities of drugs may depend on the court and the
facts of the individual case. In Fitzgerald, the Tenth Circuit placed great
emphasis on the surrounding circumstances-particularly the fact that
there was substantial public traffic to and from Fitzgerald's motel room.
Fitzgerald also shows that if a defendant wants an instruction on a lesser
included offense of simple possession, he or she must introduce evi-
dence showing that the drugs in evidence were for personal use.
3 24
Leigh Bickelhaupt
322. Id. at 792.
323. Id. The court also noted that Levy was unemployed at the time of the arrest and
was presumably without access to legitimate sources of money necessary to purchase 4.75
ounces of nearly pure cocaine. Id.
324. In Levy, the Fourth Circuit felt Levy's ownership of four pipes used for consuming
cocaine was evidence that might infer the 4.75 ounces of cocaine were for Levy's personal
consumption. Id. at 792.
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